Once standing at the center of the spotlight in the cryptocurrency industry, Sam Bankman-Fried is now in prison waiting for an increasingly slim chance.

By: Non-Small Number

On July 15, local time, the U.S. Senate passed S.Res.772 by "unanimous consent," clearly expressing the Senate's position: FTX founder Sam Bankman-Fried, also known as SBF, "should not be granted presidential clemency, reduced sentences, or any other form of executive leniency under any circumstances."

This resolution was jointly promoted by Republican Senator Cynthia Lummis from Wyoming and Democratic Senator Ruben Gallego from Arizona. A Republican with a long history of supporting the cryptocurrency industry and a Democratic senator coming together on the SBF issue sends a strong bipartisan signal.

It should be noted that "unanimous consent" in the Senate does not equate to a roll call vote with all 100 senators voting in favor. The U.S. Senate website explains this procedure as follows: a measure can be passed by unanimous consent as long as no senator voices an objection. Therefore, a more accurate statement is that S.Res.772 faced no public opposition in the Senate.

This resolution does not have direct legal binding power. It cannot lengthen SBF's sentence nor legally strip the president of his pardon power.

However, in American politics, the significance of some resolutions is not about whether they can directly change the law, but rather about publicly delineating a political red line: even if there are significant differences between the two U.S. parties on cryptocurrency regulation, market structure, and the direction of digital asset development, they at least reached a rare consensus on one issue—SBF should not escape criminal responsibility due to the political influence of the cryptocurrency industry.

1. SBF is not a "failed investment," but has been found guilty of misusing client funds

To understand why the U.S. Senate is so explicitly opposed to pardoning SBF, we first need to return to the FTX case itself.

Before its collapse, FTX was one of the most influential cryptocurrency trading platforms in the world. SBF not only frequently appeared in mainstream financial media and international conferences but also testified before the U.S. Congress, participated in discussions on cryptocurrency regulation, and quickly entered the Washington policy circle through political donations.

At that time, SBF was packaged as a "new generation of crypto leader" familiar with finance, technology, and regulation. He attended formal events wearing baggy t-shirts and shorts, spoke about effective altruism, and claimed that the purpose of making money was to use wealth for more valuable causes.

However, in November 2022, FTX's liquidity crisis swiftly evolved into a full-blown collapse. As investigations deepened, a funding structure that was completely different from its previous public image gradually emerged.

U.S. prosecutors believe that FTX, controlled by SBF, did not properly safeguard user assets as promised to customers. Significant amounts of client funds were transferred to the affiliated trading firm Alameda Research and were used to pay off debts, make venture investments, purchase real estate, provide political donations, and pay other expenses.

In November 2023, a jury found all seven charges against SBF, including wire fraud, securities fraud, commodities fraud, and money laundering conspiracy, to be valid. In March 2024, he was sentenced to 25 years in prison, three years of supervised release, and ordered to forfeit over $11 billion in assets. The U.S. Department of Justice disclosed that the case involved billions of dollars in FTX client funds, FTX investors lost over $1.7 billion, and Alameda's lending institutions lost over $1.3 billion.

This is also the point that is most easily blurred when discussing the issue of SBF's pardon: the FTX case is not simply a failure of entrepreneurship, nor is it a bankruptcy due to a bear market, falling coin prices, or liquidity management errors.

Misjudgments, rapid expansions, or even eventual bankruptcies by a company do not necessarily constitute criminal offenses. However, transferring funds without customer authorization while continuing to claim that client assets are safe is a completely different issue.

In other words, SBF is being punished not for running a trading platform into the ground but because the court found he committed fraud during the operation.

2. Creditors may recover more money, can it be proven that SBF "did not cause losses"?

After FTX entered bankruptcy proceedings, the market environment changed dramatically.

The assets of FTX, including cryptocurrency and some equity investments, appreciated, and the bankruptcy management team has gradually pushed forward asset recovery and creditor payments. Thus, SBF and his supporters have gradually formed a new defense narrative: FTX is not truly insolvent; if given more time at the beginning, clients might ultimately be able to recover their funds.

This claim can indeed be somewhat misleading in public discourse.

For ordinary users, the most intuitive standard for judging whether a case is serious is often "whether the victims ultimately got their money back." If clients eventually receive a high percentage of repayment, some people will naturally question: since the money could be returned, why does SBF still need to be sentenced to 25 years?

However, from a legal standpoint, subsequent appreciation of assets does not automatically erase previous acts of fund misappropriation.

A person taking someone else's funds for investment without permission, even if they later make a profit and return the principal, cannot thereby prove that the initial act was legal. Moreover, creditors receiving payment in bankruptcy proceedings rely on bankruptcy management, asset disposal, market upswings, and years of waiting, not because FTX truly safeguarded all client assets as promised.

During SBF's appeal, his defense team also attempted to emphasize that FTX may have the ability to pay and accused the trial court of restricting their submission of certain evidence. However, on June 12, 2026, the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the original conviction and 25-year sentence, rejecting his main claims of unfair trial, evidence limitations, and issues with jury instructions. The court found that the evidence presented by the prosecution was more than sufficient.

This means that one of SBF's most important conventional legal remedies has encountered a significant setback.

After the appeal failed to overturn the original judgment, presidential clemency became a distant political possibility transformed into a realistic outlet SBF sought to pursue.

3. From appeal to pardon, SBF starts to pin hopes on the White House

In June 2026, SBF officially submitted a request for presidential clemency to the U.S. Department of Justice's Pardon Attorney's Office. The relevant application was listed as pending, just days after the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld his conviction.

Timing-wise, this is clearly not a haphazard, impromptu action.

For the past while, SBF and his supporters have been trying to rebuild their narrative in public opinion. On one hand, they emphasize that FTX clients might receive a higher percentage of repayment; on the other hand, they continuously question the trial process, portraying SBF as a victim of an unfair judicial system.

More importantly, SBF, who was once an important donor to the Democratic camp in the U.S., gradually began to show signs of aligning his public narrative with conservatives after Trump returned to power. He began discussing the so-called "weaponization of the law" and tried to link his predicament with Trump's and his supporters' criticisms of the U.S. justice system.

This is a very typical lobbying strategy for pardons: when it is legally difficult to overturn a case, attempt to repackage the criminal case as a political one; when existing political relationships cannot provide help, work hard to enter a new political narrative system.

There are those who believe this route is not entirely impossible because Trump has previously exercised his pardon power over multiple figures linked to the cryptocurrency industry, including Silk Road founder Ross Ulbricht and Binance founder Changpeng Zhao. The Trump administration's generally friendlier attitude toward the cryptocurrency industry has led to speculation about whether SBF might become the next beneficiary.

However, there are clear differences between SBF's case and those cases.

Ross Ulbricht's supporters have long emphasized that his sentence of life imprisonment is excessive, portraying him as a symbol of liberalism and internet freedom; the core of Zhao Changpeng's case revolves around anti-money laundering and compliance issues. Regardless of whether one agrees with the related pardon decisions, both types of cases can form relatively clear defense frameworks in political communication.

SBF's issues, however, are more straightforward: billions of dollars in client funds were transferred, the exchange continuously claimed that user assets were safe, multiple core members of the company pleaded guilty and testified, a jury found all seven counts to be valid, and the federal appeals court upheld the original judgment.

Pardoning SBF is difficult to package as simply correcting an excessive sentence and is more likely to be understood by the public as giving a free pass to a large-scale financial fraud.

4. The resolution has no legal effect but can significantly raise the cost of clemency

From the perspective of the U.S. Constitution, the president has broad pardon power over federal crimes, which includes not only full pardons but also sentence reductions, stays of execution, and waivers of certain fines. Except in impeachment cases, this power is difficult to directly limit through ordinary legislation or resolutions by Congress.

Therefore, even if the Senate passes S.Res.772, in theory, Trump could still choose to pardon SBF.

So why did the Senate push for such a "non-binding" resolution?

The reason is that while this resolution cannot prevent the president from signing a pardon, it can significantly increase the political cost associated with such an action.

Firstly, it establishes a clear congressional record in advance. If the president changes positions in the future and advocates for SBF's pardon, opponents can point out that this decision not only contravenes the Democratic position but also goes against the bipartisan consensus pushed by Republican senators.

Secondly, it separates SBF from ordinary cryptocurrency regulatory controversies.

Cynthia Lummis has long been one of the most active supporters of the cryptocurrency industry in the U.S. Congress. Her involvement in proposing the resolution to oppose SBF's pardon indicates that American political circles are attempting to convey a clear message: supporting Bitcoin, stablecoins, and innovations in digital assets does not mean condoning centralized platforms misappropriating client funds.

Lastly, this resolution also responds to concerns about excessive politicization of presidential pardon power.

As pardons become increasingly associated with political positions, media influence, donor relationships, and lobbying capabilities, Congress needs to make public statements to inform the public that some cases should not be easily repackaged as political persecution.

The true role of S.Res.772 is not to lock the president's pen but to ensure that anyone attempting to pick up that pen must bear a higher public relations cost.

5. This is not a simple "anti-crypto" statement

For the cryptocurrency industry, the Senate's opposition to pardoning SBF may not necessarily be a bad thing.

After the collapse of FTX, the entire cryptocurrency market paid the price for the fraud of a centralized platform. User confidence in exchanges collapsed, several related institutions fell into crisis, regulators tightened their scrutiny comprehensively, and the general public found it easier to confuse innovations in digital assets with financial scams.

Those who truly wish to promote the long-term development of the industry need to cut ties with the SBF model.

The cryptocurrency industry can oppose excessive regulation, promote clearer stablecoin regulations, demand that regulators provide clear compliance pathways for trading platforms and digital asset projects, and criticize the traditional financial system's exclusion of new technologies.

However, none of these positions imply that platforms can misuse client funds.

A healthy financial market must first acknowledge that the assets users deposit on platforms are not the private funds of the founders. Regardless of whether the platform uses blockchain, artificial intelligence, or any new technology, this most fundamental business and legal principle cannot be changed.

This is also the most symbolic aspect of Lummis's involvement in promoting the resolution: being crypto-friendly is not the same as being tolerant of crime.

Genuine industry-friendly policies should protect normal entrepreneurs, developers, and investors, rather than allowing a founder with media resources, political connections, and vast wealth to escape prison early through political lobbying after causing significant losses.

Conclusion: The two U.S. parties debate the future of crypto but give the same answer on the SBF issue

S.Res.772 will not make SBF sit in prison for one more day, nor will it completely close the door to his possibility of receiving presidential pardon.

As long as the U.S. president is willing, constitutionally, SBF could still receive a reduced sentence or even a pardon. However, from the perspective of realpolitik, the obstacles he faces have clearly increased.

Trump has previously publicly stated his intention not to pardon SBF; the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld his conviction and 25-year sentence in June 2026; now, the U.S. Senate has further publicly opposed any form of executive leniency through a bipartisan resolution.

These three signals combined mean that SBF's application for pardon is transitioning from "unlikely" to "politically untenable."

The two U.S. parties will continue to debate how digital assets should be regulated, who should manage stablecoins, what rules trading platforms should follow, and where the boundaries between Wall Street and the crypto market should be drawn.

But on the SBF issue, they have temporarily provided a rather consistent answer:

Innovation can be encouraged, entrepreneurial failure can be tolerated, and market risks can be borne by investors; but treating clients' money as one's own chips and then packaging crime as an ordinary business failure should not be a reason for obtaining political clemency.