Written by: @nataliebrunell
Translated by: Aki Wu on Blockchain
The content of this article does not constitute any investment or financial advice. Readers are advised to strictly comply with the laws and regulations of their respective locations.
Michael Saylor, Executive Chairman of Strategy, stated in an interview on Natalie Brunell's podcast that the recent price movement of Bitcoin has been flat, which is a sign of strength rather than weakness. The market is in a consolidation phase, with early holders gradually cashing out while institutions are waiting for volatility to decrease before entering. The core focus of the interview is on "reconstructing the credit market with Bitcoin." He believes that the traditional credit market is "hungry for yield and lacks liquidity," and that Bitcoin collateral can create stable cash flow without selling spot assets, integrating Bitcoin into mainstream funding channels for credit and stock indices; companies primarily pay dividends through continuous equity financing, supplemented by derivatives like futures/options, and seek qualifications for ratings and inclusion in mainstream indices.
Statement: This article is a video transcript published on September 19, and some information may be outdated. The content does not constitute any investment advice and does not represent Wu's views or positions.
Why is the market sentiment towards Bitcoin weakening now?
Michael Saylor: I believe that both macroeconomic factors and community sentiment experience natural ups and downs. Bitcoin goes through periods of rapid increases and excitement, where emotions are extremely heightened, and adrenaline is surging, followed by celebrations and linear extrapolation (as if "going to the moon"). Then the price retracts and consolidates, and many people expect a quick rebound, but instead, it moves sideways for a while.
There is always a tendency for frustration in human nature. But I don't think there's anything to be frustrated about. The fact is, if you zoom out to a one-year cycle, Bitcoin has increased by about 99%, nearly doubling. If someone says they have heavily invested in an asset that has nearly a 100% annual increase—shouldn't they be happy? Of course, they should. It's just that the path to realization is often more volatile.
As for the recent sideways support, I believe it is largely because about $2.3 trillion worth of Bitcoin is in a "unbanked" state, with many holders unable to obtain loans using BTC as collateral. When you hold a lot of Bitcoin but lack fiat currency and cannot borrow money, the only thing you can often do is sell your coins. Currently, Bitcoin is somewhat like a "Magnificent 7-level startup," where employees are extremely wealthy on paper due to options but cannot use them as collateral for loans, so they have to sell. Outsiders may ask: Is the employee selling shares because they lack confidence in the company? The answer is no—they just need to send their kids to college, buy a house, or support their parents.
Thus, the current selling pressure mainly comes from seasoned crypto OGs, who are diversifying their positions by about 5% or similar operations. The market is digesting this selling pressure and solidifying support, with volatility converging—this is actually a good sign. For an asset to mature, it needs more long-term capital (large enterprises and institutions) to enter; early OGs who bought in at $10 or even $1 are cashing out moderately to feel more secure; after volatility decreases, super-large institutions will enter on a large scale. The contradiction is that when super-large institutions enter and volatility decreases, the market may seem "boring" for a while, adrenaline fades, and people's sentiment turns bearish. But this is just a normal growth phase in the process of asset monetization.
Can Bitcoin, which has "no cash flow," become a quality asset?
Natalie Brunell: I recently attended some events alongside TradFi practitioners, and the reasons for not allocating Bitcoin were almost unanimous: no cash flow; some financial institution employees are prohibited from directly purchasing Bitcoin due to compliance. How do you view these concerns? From the perspective of TradFi, what progress have we made? What changes are needed to get more people to embrace Bitcoin?
Michael Saylor: I believe that many of the most important "property-type assets" in Western civilization—such as diamonds, gold, classical master paintings, and land—do not generate cash flow.
Many truly important things in our lives also do not generate cash flow: marriage and children do not produce cash flow, real estate does not generate cash flow; a Nobel Prize does not produce cash flow; yachts and private jets also do not generate cash flow. Many things that are universally regarded as "valuable" in the world are not judged by cash flow. Moreover, in terms of currency, "perfect money" should not have cash flow—money is defined by high liquidity and strong marketability. If you want something to serve as money, it should not have too strong of a "use value": for example, gold is more suitable as money than silver precisely because it has fewer industrial uses; once materials with high use value, like copper or silicon, are involved, they become less suitable as money.
Some may say: "No cash flow means it's not a good investment asset." This viewpoint has gradually formed over the past two generations. Since 1971, the global mainstream asset allocation concept has evolved into: long-term capital = a 60/40 bond-stock portfolio—bonds provide coupons, and equities provide dividends or profits, and the world understands assets based on this. Ultimately, the S&P 500 has become the dominant benchmark.
If we look at indexed investments, about 85% of index funds are allocated to the S&P 500. When many people think of "long-term capital," they are thinking of funds that preserve and appreciate value using stock indices (like the S&P 500 Index). Vanguard commercialized this idea, launching and popularizing the concept of the Vanguard 500 and index funds. When the idea of "a fund composed of 500 constituent stocks" achieves extreme success, and the entire institutional system of S&P, Vanguard, and mutual funds is built on this thinking, they are unlikely to immediately embrace a better disruptive new idea; it is more about path dependence. This is a practical issue.
In an era where the dollar is the currency, the U.S. economy continues to develop, and the dollar is the world's reserve currency, and since the end of World War II (1945), there has never been a global world war, you find yourself in a specific environment at a specific point in time. In the language of differential equations, this is a particular solution obtained under fixed boundary conditions: if all boundary conditions are fixed, substituting these numbers will yield the corresponding answer; as long as these assumptions/boundary conditions are not changed, this solution holds.
However, once the material changes from aluminum to steel (metaphorically, external conditions change), the original formula no longer applies. At this point, you can no longer use the particular solution; you must return to the "homogeneous solution," no longer looking up formulas in a tabulated manner, but deriving from first principles like a physicist. In reality, most people have never truly derived anything from first principles in their lives—they are using "particular solutions" provided by others.
When the entire monetary system collapses, this method of "using particular solutions" will fail. For example, in Lebanon, if your bank account is frozen and your local currency becomes worthless; in some African countries; or during the currency collapse in Argentina—even if you hold cash flow-generating assets, they will be nearly worthless when priced in local currency. Ironically, those assets traditionally considered "safe and cash flow-generating" become unsafe when priced in Nigerian Naira, Venezuelan Bolivar, Argentine Peso, Lebanese Pound, Iraqi Dinar, or Afghan Afghani. Similarly, in Russia, this was also the case before the severe devaluation of the ruble in the late 1990s.
Those who cling to old ideas hold a set of "particular solutions" that only work within a highly stable, closed system. This system has neither undergone external stress testing nor truly faced challenges from new ideas. Those who can truly understand Bitcoin often come from extremely chaotic environments where local currencies have collapsed, forcing them to think independently; or they are essentially first-principles thinkers—questioning everything like scientists and re-deriving.
Thus, the most ironic thing is: Vanguard's CEO says Bitcoin is not investable because it has no cash flow; yet the largest shareholder of my company is Vanguard. As Musk said: "The most ironic outcomes are often the most likely to occur."
What pain points do you see in the traditional fixed income space, and how can Bitcoin address them?
Michael Saylor: When discussing the credit market, you will find three characteristics. The first is mortgage-backed securities (MBS), with a leverage ratio of about 1.5 times, yielding approximately 2%–4%. There is also fiat credit—backed by the government's promise that "it can continue to print money," which sets the so-called "risk-free rate." For example, Japan is about +50 basis points, Switzerland about -50 basis points, Europe about +200 basis points per year, and the U.S. about +400 basis points per year, with a recent reduction of 25 basis points.
Furthermore, there is corporate credit, supported by corporate cash flow—whether it is high-quality companies like the "Magnificent Seven" (such as Microsoft, Apple, etc.), high-yield bonds (junk bonds), or struggling companies. Their credit spreads are generally in the range of 50–500 basis points. For example, if you buy a corporate bond in Europe, it might yield 2.5% annually. However, the real monetary inflation rate is often higher.
Therefore, Japan, Switzerland, Europe, and the U.S. are all in varying degrees of a state of financial repression: the nominal yield of so-called "risk-free" fiat assets is lower than the rate of monetary expansion and lower than the appreciation rate of scarce, desirable assets. This is the first challenge. The second challenge is that these tools have poor liquidity (some are similar to old-fashioned preferred stocks), are difficult to trade, and may not trade for long periods, and are under-collateralized. The credit market we observe is weak and unhealthy. For example, if you put money in a bank in Switzerland and only receive 0% or even have 50 basis points deducted, it is hard not to call this a "yield famine." Many markets are eager to create yield.
Michael Saylor: On the other hand, at an event I spoke at a few days ago, there were about 500 people. I asked, "How many of you have bank accounts?" Almost everyone raised their hand, but if I asked, "How many of you have an annualized interest rate over 4.5% on your checking or savings account?" almost no one did. Then I asked, "If a bank account could offer an annual interest rate of 8–10%, would you be willing?" Everyone in the room was willing, but who is offering such long-term rates? No one.
The opportunity we see in the market is: unless you hold Bitcoin, possessing an asset that can store value long-term (which I call digital capital), and are willing to hold it for 30–40 years, no one will give you a fair, long-term yield. Please tell me: who will give you 10% interest for the rest of your life? Your bank won't give you (a long-term 10% rate), companies won't, governments won't, and MBS issuers won't.
Why is a 10% long-term interest rate difficult to establish in the traditional system?
Michael Saylor: The reason is that no company can reliably generate a stable return above 10% annually in the long term; moreover, borrowers of mortgage loans cannot afford such costs. Furthermore, stable governments are also unwilling to do so; they prefer to pay you far below that level. Weak governments are forced to offer higher interest rates, but their currencies and political situations are often heading towards collapse, so you cannot find a reliable national borrower who can sustain such rates over the long term. You can hardly find companies willing to do this—most companies' financial strategies are not "issue more debt and manage it well," but rather to take on less debt and buy back stock.
We find that Bitcoin is digital capital. The appreciation of Bitcoin has long outpaced that of the S&P 500. Once you acknowledge that Bitcoin appreciates faster than the S&P 500, and my assumption for the next 21 years is that its annual compound growth rate is about 29%, then you can use such appreciating assets as collateral to create credit.
Bitcoin is digital capital with an appreciation rate that exceeds the cost of capital; the cost of capital can be approximated by the long-term return of the S&P 500. The credit issued against it is digital credit. This digital credit can have longer or shorter durations, can set higher yields, and can be denominated in any fiat currency because Bitcoin is stronger (more scarce, lower inflation).
A key point in the credit market is that the currency used to price debt should be weaker than the "currency" corresponding to the collateral you hold. If you price debt in a stronger currency while holding weaker collateral assets, you will end up in a negative spread and ultimately go bankrupt. This is common in some countries where residents borrow in dollars but repay in local currency, and when the local currency collapses, they end up bankrupt.
Therefore, we can choose to issue debt in relatively weaker currencies such as yen, Swiss francs, euros, or dollars. This way, we can bear the currency risk while providing higher yields (similar to the coupon levels of distressed debt), but with collateral multiples far exceeding those of U.S. investment-grade companies—not 2-3 times, but 5 times or even 10 times over-collateralization.
Thus, we can create credit instruments that are lower in risk, longer in duration, and higher in yield, and design them as quasi-perpetual structures for public issuance (listing), thereby achieving better liquidity. In summary, we aim to provide a smarter, faster, and stronger credit product that has better long-term liquidity, lower risk, and higher yield.
For any Bitcoin treasury-type company, the opportunity lies in: you hold the world's highest quality collateral—Bitcoin, which is digital capital. If you issue digital credit based on this, you can create the highest quality credit instruments globally. The volatility and yield stripped from this credit side will transfer and amplify to the equity of common shareholders. Thus, you gain an exposure to "amplified Bitcoin" on the equity side, while "taming" Bitcoin into a low-risk, low-volatility, yield-generating asset on the debt side.
What was previously labeled as "having no cash flow" is now endowed with cash flow. Ironically, many investors who prefer traditional credit—those who are only willing to buy cash flow—will buy bonds or even the stock of a loss-making company, even if that company's operating cash flow cannot cover the interest payments, yet they still emphasize "at least there is cash flow." What we are doing now is generating cash flow from Bitcoin, turning it into a credit asset that can be included in bond indices; at the same time, we create equity exposure that can outperform, allowing it to enter stock indices. Both paths can continuously raise funds, serving as entry points for capital. Capital flows into the Bitcoin ecosystem through these entry points, and we then purchase Bitcoin, thereby providing funding and momentum for the Bitcoin network.
What is perpetual preferred stock? What customizable terms does it have compared to bonds and convertible bonds?
Natalie Brunell: You pointed out that capital is severely mispriced at present: collateral in the traditional world is often overvalued, while Bitcoin is undervalued. Based on this, you see an opportunity and have launched a series of credit instruments—STRIKE, STRIDE, and now STRETCH. Let's clarify: many people are not clear on what preferred stock is. The name includes "stock/share," but in practice, it resembles a credit instrument, even similar to a bond, providing yield. Can you explain the essence of preferred stock? Additionally, you issue perpetual preferred stock; what is unique about this structure in the market?
Michael Saylor: Preferred stock is a second class of shares distinct from common stock. Common stock represents ultimate ownership of the company but typically does not have special priority or guarantees. Preferred stock can stipulate dividends: for example, fixed distributions monthly or quarterly, or floating with SOFR (Secured Overnight Financing Rate), which can be fixed or variable. You can write cash flow and yield rights into preferred stock.
Preferred stock can also set conversion terms: for instance, it can be convertible into common stock at a ratio of 1/10 or 1/5, or fully convertible. You can set it with certain equity upside, certain yields, liquidation priority, and can create higher priority levels, adding guarantee clauses such as cumulative preferred dividends—if we miss a distribution, it accumulates; or stipulating default penalties—missing a distribution incurs interest penalties. In short, preferred stock is a versatile "container" where you can almost write in any terms you need.
Natalie Brunell: And it is not debt, right? Unlike convertible bonds, which must repay principal at maturity. You finance through preferred stock without needing to repay principal.
Michael Saylor: Correct, it typically differs from debt instruments, which require principal repayment at some point. Of course, you can also make preferred stock "debt-like": for example, granting holders a put option requiring the company to buy back in cash; or giving it a redemption right, making it appear more like debt.
Conversely, you can also make it more equity-like: for example, non-cumulative—principal never matures, and even if distributions are paused, no cumulative interest or liabilities accrue (STRIDE is non-cumulative). Therefore, preferred stock can be adjusted across a full spectrum from very bond-like to very stock-like, making it a very flexible security form for a public company.
Michael Saylor: If you are a public company and hold a large amount of Bitcoin, you can design such securities yourself and then publicly issue them. The first step of innovation is to "create" this tool; the second step is to list it—such as using a four-letter code (like STRC) for the IPO. The third step of innovation is: once publicly listed, you can also submit a shelf registration for it. This means that initially, you might sell a scale of $1 billion at once, and then you can almost continuously issue more, like selling an additional $50 million each week; this is very similar to how ETF shares increase with capital inflow—like IBIT growing, almost "daily subscriptions and daily expansions."
Therefore, when you create a publicly traded preferred stock that has completed a shelf registration, you have almost created a "quasi-proprietary ETF." It combines the advantages of an ETF while also having the benefits of proprietary assets—because you are creating this credit tool in real-time; rather than like some "junk bond ETF," which first collects investors' funds and then buys a bunch of other people's junk bonds in the market. ETF providers merely add a "shell" to others' assets; when you make a "digital credit tool" into preferred stock, you are actually creating a native tool whose chain runs vertically through to the underlying asset of Bitcoin.
Natalie Brunell: Over-collateralized.
Michael Saylor: Exactly, under this structure, you can design a preferred stock that is 10 times over-collateralized, with an annualized 10% dividend, and pays dividends perpetually. Once the terms are set, I can issue a certain scale of products under these conditions.
What problems do Strike, Strife, Stride, and Stretch each solve?
Michael Saylor: So far, we have designed four types of tools. The first is called Strike. Its concept is: pay an 8% dividend based on face value, set at $100, continuously paying an 8% dividend; while also giving holders a conversion ratio—allowing conversion into MSTR common stock at a ratio of 1/10. Thus, if MicroStrategy's stock price is around $350, this tool embeds about $35 of equity value. In other words, it has both equity upside and provides downside protection through liquidation priority, while generating continuous cash flow through dividends. From a design perspective, this type of tool aims to achieve upside with minimal downside risk while receiving yield during the waiting period.
The second tool is Strife (STRF), with a face value of 10% yield. Simply put, you can think of it as a "long-term (even perpetual) high-yield note," with a face value of $100, paying 10%. We also place it at a senior level in the capital structure and specify in the contract: no preferred stock with higher priority than STRF will be issued, so STRF will always be the highest priority long-term credit tool. This is important for "risk-averse" credit investors—because it means their principal amount is better protected.
This is a positive factor at the "credit" level and can also elevate our credit rating in the eyes of investors. After issuance, it trades at a price above face value, showing significant appreciation. The pricing logic is that as the company's credit improves, market acceptance of Bitcoin increases, and Bitcoin prices rise, the price may move from 85 (discounted) back to 100 (face value), then to 110, 120, 150, or even 200. Since this is a perpetual tool, it can very well remain at a premium for the long term, thus anchoring the company's cost of capital. In other words, if you are asking, "What should the market price be for a company with Bitcoin as its core asset and investment-grade credit for its long-term (equivalent to 30-year) debt rate?" the current market price effectively provides the answer.
The third tool is Stride (STRD). Its design is: based on Strife (STRF), removing the two stipulations related to "penalty clauses" and "cumulative dividend clauses," while keeping everything else consistent. Thus, it remains a "10% dividend/yield based on face value," but its nature shifts from senior long-term credit to subordinated long-term credit. The former is more bond-like, with a higher tier in the capital structure and lower risk; the latter is closer to equity, with a lower tier and higher risk, only above common stock. After issuance, STRD trades at an effective yield of 12.7%; in contrast, STRF has an effective yield of about 9%. Thus, there is a credit spread of 370 basis points between the "safest" and "riskiest" tools.
Some may ask—also somewhat counterintuitive—why the issuance scale of Stride (STRD) is twice that of Strife (STRF) and is more successful? Clearly, it lacks cumulative dividend rights and penalties, and is still subordinated. The answer is simple: they believe in Bitcoin and trust this company. At the same time, they want yield. If you put money in an account, would you prefer an annualized return of 12.7% or 9%? The question becomes: do you trust the "bank" holding your funds? Once you trust the other party, and they offer you 12% instead of 9%, you will naturally choose the former.
Who else would trust the company? The shareholders themselves. Just like who would trust Bitcoin? Bitcoin holders. In the end, it comes down to what you choose to trust. These tools bring two core benefits:
First, they provide an opportunity for those who believe in the company and Bitcoin to earn a 12.7% return, which is very attractive to them;
Second, they allow the company to continue building collateral assets beneath senior tools, which is credit positive: beneficial for Strife, beneficial for Strike, and beneficial for everything else. At the same time, it provides the company with a scalable way to leverage the purchase of Bitcoin, which itself carries no counterparty credit risk.
Theoretically, if the market can absorb $100 billion of Stride, we would issue $100 billion of Stride, raising the company's leverage to 90%, and then buy Bitcoin. This is beneficial for Bitcoin, beneficial for common stock; the rise in common stock will also benefit the "equity embedded portion" of Strike. Additionally, because we have purchased a large amount of Bitcoin, it means that Strife's collateral will reach 50 times over-collateralization. Therefore, this is beneficial for credit, beneficial for convertible bonds, beneficial for stocks, beneficial for Bitcoin, and beneficial for Stride holders—this creates a flywheel effect. This is the reason we launched Stride.
The final product is Stretch. Its starting point is: many people say they want fixed income, like increasing a 5% bank interest rate to 10%, but they do not want volatility. They do not want the market price of the principal to fluctuate by $10. If I buy at a price of 110 and then it drops to 105 due to interest rate changes, that would mean losing a year's worth of interest. Therefore, we want to find a solution that anchors the price around a face value of $100, minimizes volatility as much as possible, while extracting yield.
So the core idea of Stretch is: we do not want duration risk. Products like Strife have a long duration, equivalent to a 120-month interest rate duration, which causes the principal price to fluctuate significantly around the face value. In fact, for every 1% change in interest rates, if the asset has a 20-year duration, the principal price may change by 20%. Therefore, we want to strip away the entire duration—not 120 months, but reduce it to 1 month. When you strip away the duration, you also strip away the volatility; after all, the volatility of a 30-year bond is much greater than that of a 1-month asset.
We aim to reduce volatility by stripping away duration. To achieve this, the product structure must change to monthly rather than quarterly, so we convert the dividends to monthly cash distributions and introduce a floating monthly dividend rate. This is the first time in modern capital markets that a company has issued "monthly floating dividend" preferred stock. We call it Treasury Preferred. This is something we invented based on AI—I designed it using AI. No one had thought of doing this before because there was no underlying asset to support such a design. However, Stretch is not a "zero-volatility high-yield checking account," nor can it allow you to deposit $1082.32 today and withdraw exactly $1082.32 tomorrow; it is not at that level yet. But it is quite close: you can put in funds that you need to hold for a year and receive a 10% dividend with extremely low volatility; if you need to retrieve your funds, you can sell in the secondary market to redeem the principal.
This is more like a quasi-money market tool supported by Bitcoin as collateral. Of course, it does not yet achieve the low volatility of a true money market fund, but its goal is to compete at the short end of the interest rate curve under the endorsement of Bitcoin.
You promise not to sell Bitcoin, so where does the dividend funding supported by Bitcoin come from?
Michael Saylor: We currently have about $6 billion in these preferred stocks. We pay about $600 million in dividends each year. The company's enterprise value is approximately $120 billion, and we sell about $20 billion in common stock each year. So you can understand it this way: we basically sell the first $600 million of common stock to pay dividends; the remaining portion of the $20 billion is all used to buy more Bitcoin.
In other words, we are raising funds in the equity capital market at a very fast pace. Only about 5% of the equity capital raised is earmarked for paying dividends, while the rest is used to increase our Bitcoin holdings. In case of certain reasons that prevent us from selling stock anymore, we already hold a large amount of Bitcoin and can issue credit-type instruments or sell derivatives to cope.
For example, we can sell Bitcoin derivatives—hedged short Bitcoin futures, or sell out-of-the-money call options. Additionally, there is a strategy called "basis trading," where you use your held spot Bitcoin as collateral to sell futures to hedge the spot, allowing you to earn basis income. Therefore, the main way the company pays dividends is actually through the continuous sale of common stock; secondary methods include selling derivatives on Bitcoin. Moreover, the credit market is also open to us, and we can occasionally enter different credit markets for financing.
Natalie Brunell: Is the goal to have these tools rated by mainstream rating agencies? What does that mean?
Michael Saylor: Yes. Our current goal is to build the company into the first Bitcoin treasury company to receive an investment-grade rating, and more broadly, the first investment-grade crypto company; at the same time, we want all the various tools we issue to receive ratings from rating agencies, which requires a lot of meetings and communication, but I am confident we will achieve this in the end.
Why has it not been included in the S&P 500 to this day?
Michael Saylor: The S&P 500 has a set of inclusion standards, and we only met those standards this quarter. We have not met them for the past five years. You must be profitable and meet a series of conditions. I believe we only qualify after adopting fair value accounting. The second quarter of 2025 is the first quarter we will qualify. We do not expect to be included in the S&P 500 the first time we qualify. Tesla was not included when it first qualified either.
We are considered a disruptive new company, and this is a disruptive new asset class. For a traditional committee that tends to avoid risk and has to make decisions for billions, hundreds of billions, or even trillions of dollars, it is entirely reasonable to wait a few more quarters. They are likely to say, "Let's see how the second quarter goes. If this business continues to show sustainability in two to five quarters…"
To be honest, if someone adopts a new idea after four quarters of performance, that would already be considered quite innovative and aggressive. Many times, people wait three to five years to acknowledge something. So I do not expect to be included in the first quarter. I believe that after several quarters, when we establish a performance record that can be validated by the industry, we will be included. In fact, S&P has already included Coinbase and Robinhood in the index. I do not think they are rejecting the crypto asset class or Bitcoin and digital assets. It is just that the exchange business has existed for hundreds of years, and its history is longer and easier to understand.
The so-called "Bitcoin Treasury company" is an emerging new species, very revolutionary. I define the starting point of the entire Treasury company industry as November 5, 2024. Now we have gone through about three quarters, and it is very clear that this is a legitimate, compliant, and independent new type of company. The market can also see that in the past 12 months, the number of companies in the industry has grown from 60 to 185, and the industry is in a high-growth mode.
Natalie Brunell: We have indeed grown to nearly 200, but as you have seen, the premiums on net asset value (NAV) are converging, and some consolidation is occurring. Can you talk about the market reaction outside the Bitcoin circle? Do they see Bitcoin Treasury companies as future "institutional-grade" allocations? How do they value these companies? Do you still see a slow adoption rate? Will there be any catalysts to change this?
Michael Saylor: I believe the market is still in a learning phase. Just now, I spoke with 25 investors, and I would ask them: how familiar are you with this? For example, "Tell us about Bitcoin; will Bitcoin be banned?"—we really have to start from scratch: there has been no comprehensive ban on Bitcoin in 2023. Then we have to go through the entire crypto industry, explain various credit tools, and then explain equity. Overall, most market participants are still catching up.
To put it another way: it feels like it is now 1870, and people are just starting to refine crude oil, with a batch of new companies emerging around "what can oil do." Then, someone proposes the idea of acrylic or polycarbonate (Lexan), and various petrochemical materials and products like polyester, spandex, and nylon emerge. Some talk about kerosene, some advocate for using diesel or gasoline, and others discuss asphalt. All the investors sit together and ask: is this really a good idea? How big will this industry be? They are still struggling to figure out "how large the kerosene business can be in 180 countries." By the way, the first generation of kerosene applications was for lighting fixtures—first for lighting, then became engine fuel, then heating oil, and later became aviation fuel, and now even rocket fuel.
Therefore, I believe this industry is still extremely early, and various companies are still learning how to articulate what they are doing and deciding on their business models; investors are trying to understand these models and the industry; regulatory agencies are also dynamically evolving the rules—everything is happening in real-time. This is a "digital gold rush." In the decade from 2025 to 2035, there will be a large number of different business models, products, and companies that will make a lot of money, make many mistakes, and also create a lot of wealth—this is the noise and chaos of the market.
In the context of public opinion and social division, what kind of "peaceful" coordination mechanism can Bitcoin provide?
Natalie Brunell: Many people have been feeling heavy-hearted over the past week. This country seems more divided than ever, with people attacking and tearing each other apart online. Do you have anything to say? Because you clearly find a lot of hope in Bitcoin, and you always emphasize how it empowers individuals. Nothing benefits both the rich and the poor like Bitcoin. I think we need a message of hope right now, especially in the aftermath of the Charlie Kirk assassination attempt.
Michael Saylor: The message I want to convey is that our consensus is far greater than mainstream media would have you believe. Take the Bitcoin community, for example; there are often two factions within the community. When I go online, the public opinion can be very intense, colorful, and emotionally charged; people can be swept up in emotions and lash out at me; one faction of developers may be furious with another faction of developers. Ironically, we actually agree on 99.9% of the issues.
When you dig a little deeper, you find that incendiary content spreads more easily; rumors travel faster than the truth; extreme positions spread more rapidly in cyberspace, on X, and in the broader ecosystem. I even notice that even during the company's most successful periods, the amount of hate and toxic information published online is often the highest. I would follow the trail and look at the accounts that post negative, hateful, and accusatory content.
What I often see is: that is not a real person at all—never interacted with anyone, has only about three hundred followers, and shares no common interests with me. A second look, and you realize: this is a bot account. Many toxic and inflammatory behaviors online are actually guerrilla marketing: for example, those shorting my company's stock will spend money to hire a digital marketing firm to generate bots that post a large volume of malicious, sarcastic, and cynical content, creating a false appearance of "protest." The same goes for the political realm: many "emotional mobilizations" are actually paid astroturfers, where people are paid to protest or post online. Then mainstream media focuses on these paid protesters or fake bots, saying "public sentiment is surging online" or "there is a strong outcry in a certain place," broadcasting to millions, creating an illusion of social disorder and public discontent. Unfortunately, when you continuously amplify false protests, there will always be a very small number of people incited to commit violence, turning the falsehood into reality and resulting in tragedy.
What I want to say to everyone is that perhaps this is the warning brought to us by that tragedy—the "Kirk Incident": there indeed exist some malfunctioning mechanisms in society that specialize in "creating division," thriving on amplifying splits. As long as we perform some "surgery" on these "amplifiers of division" and turn them off, people can actually come together again—turn off the toxic amplifiers.
Another point is to learn to discern: if you read 37 negative comments, you might think everyone hates you. I often feel online that everyone hates everything I do; but in the real world, I have never encountered anyone who expressed dissatisfaction to my face. You might ask: why do people offline seem quite happy, while those online are so unhappy? The reason lies in the choice of lens. There is a saying: "Only the bleeding make the headlines."
Natalie Brunell: Yes, I understand the news industry very well.
Michael Saylor: So the lens is always looking for "social unrest." But my point is: much of the unrest is "bought." Some create unrest in cyberspace and also in reality; then unhealthy media amplify and spread it. The public is actually experiencing aesthetic fatigue and becoming increasingly alert—this growing distrust of these systems is the social immune mechanism kicking in. Overall, this will catalyze more positive behaviors and constructive public participation. I am very confident and optimistic: over time, we will move towards a healthier world and a healthier political community. But the premise is: do not blindly trust everything you are told, do not fully believe everything you read, and learn to think independently.
At the same time, when you find a bunch of bot accounts amplifying toxicity on your timeline, do not interact with them. Just like when you see 52 hired protesters on the street corner, do not engage in an argument—these are "mercenaries" being paid to do a job, and you cannot persuade them; they are hired to hold that viewpoint. We have seen many similar scenarios in the crypto industry: when Greenpeace and the Sierra Club claim "Bitcoin is not environmentally friendly," you cannot persuade them—this is not coming from a sincere discussion or feedback, but from paid protests. I hope society can examine the consequences of paid protests and then take a step back to think.
Natalie Brunell: Ultimately, Bitcoin is more like a peaceful revolution: it may deprive the power structures that profit from the "attention business" of their funding sources and shift value towards a more peaceful and beneficial system for the public. This is basically the inspiration I got from your view that "Bitcoin brings hope."
Michael Saylor: This is what we have always said, that Bitcoin is a way to achieve peace, fairness, and to resolve our differences. As more people adopt it, peace will spread, fairness will spread, truth will spread, and toxicity will fade.
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