The failure of Bitcoin BIP-110 was expected. Miners naturally wouldn’t support it. Bitcoin miners’ incentives are clear: besides earning block rewards, they also make money from transaction fees. Data transactions like Ordinals, inscriptions, BRC-20, and Runes are often willing to pay high fees to compete for block space, directly increasing miners’ revenue. Restricting the writing of such data is essentially cutting off a portion of paid demand, so miners have no reason to support it. Looking deeper: BIP-110 used a very low 55% signaling threshold + a forced signaling window (AmericaF style), which shows it lacked broad economic consensus. Traditional soft forks require close to 95% miner signaling, mainly to ensure the network doesn’t split easily. The results confirmed this: Signaling was mostly below 1%, with a peak of only around 2%–3%, mainly supported by a few pools like Ocean. Once the forced window opened, the supporting nodes could only split off into a minority chain with very low hash power, while the main chain continued as usual. Ultimately, changes to Bitcoin’s rules must be decided collectively by the economic majority (miners + nodes + exchanges + holders). It’s very difficult for a minority, such as a single developer or node client, to push something through unilaterally. From both an incentive and governance structure perspective, miners not supporting this was an expected outcome. That minority chain is now almost stagnant, while Bitcoin continues to operate under its original rules. This is yet another confirmation of Bitcoin’s principle of ‘economic consensus first.’