Don't forget that Japan will raise interest rates next week. The liquidity improvement brought about by the Federal Reserve's interest rate cut and balance sheet expansion this time will collide head-on with the liquidity tightening brought about by Japan's interest rate hike. Let's explore the attitude of the United States towards Japan's interest rate hike. At present, the United States maintains policy neutrality on the surface, but in essence, it is a support and tacit approval after multiple interests are weighed, and even indirectly promotes this process through public opinion guidance and policy communication channels when necessary. The fundamental logic is that although Japan's interest rate hike will raise the country's financing costs and intensify financial and corporate pressures in the short term, from the perspective of the United States' medium - and long-term strategic interests, this measure will help resolve multiple global structural risks that are accumulating, and its importance far exceeds the short-term benefits that can be obtained by maintaining low interest rates in Japan. The primary core concern of the United States is to maintain the stability of the US bond market. As one of the main overseas holders of US Treasury bonds, Japan continues to face pressure from the depreciation of the yen. If the exchange rate falls, the Japanese authorities will have to use foreign exchange reserves to intervene, and the most liquid asset among them is US Treasury bonds. If Japan is forced to sell off its US bonds on a large scale, it will directly push up US bond yields and impact the already high fiscal financing costs of the United States. Against the backdrop of historically high federal deficits and rapidly growing interest payments, this passive sell-off is difficult for the United States to bear. In contrast, Japan's proactive interest rate hike to stabilize the yen exchange rate, thereby avoiding the use of foreign reserves and selling off US bonds, is a lower cost and more controllable option for the United States. Furthermore, the United States needs Japan's monetary policy normalization to mitigate the growing risks of yen carry trades worldwide. For a long time, the Japanese yen has served as an extremely low-cost financing currency, giving rise to a large amount of global leverage to borrow yen and invest in high-risk areas such as the US technology sector, AI assets, and cryptocurrencies. This implicit leverage boosted US asset prices during the boom period, but also planted potential systemic risks. Once the US economy enters a downturn cycle or market sentiment reverses, the rapid appreciation of the yen may trigger a global wave of carry trades, leading to a stampede decline in US stocks and related assets. The United States obviously does not want this highly concentrated leverage to be cleared in a catastrophic way in the future, so it is more inclined to push Japan to raise interest rates in a moderate and orderly manner in advance, gradually reducing global leverage and thus reducing the risk of severe turbulence in the US financial market in the future. From the perspective of industrial competition and strategic autonomy, the United States also holds a reserved attitude towards Japan's long-term maintenance of ultra-low interest rates and weak yen. The weak yen has significantly enhanced Japan's export competitiveness in industries such as automobiles, semiconductor equipment, and precision machinery, which are precisely the key areas where the United States is striving to return to the domestic market through industrial policies such as the Inflation Reduction Act. If Japan continues to consolidate its manufacturing position through its exchange rate advantage, it will directly weaken the United States' efforts to reshape its domestic supply chain and manufacturing competitiveness. Therefore, the normalization of Japan's currency is not only a financial issue, but also seen by the United States as a part of the global industrial policy balance. In addition, the United States hopes that the global interest rate structure can gradually return to a relatively balanced state. In the past two years, the Federal Reserve has aggressively raised interest rates while Japan has adhered to zero interest rates, resulting in an extreme widening of the US Japan interest rate differential. This not only exacerbates the pressure of yen depreciation, but also leads to excessive capital concentration in the United States. Although this imbalance supports the US financial market in the short term, it will distort global capital allocation, push up the US dollar exchange rate and bond yields, damage US exports, and bring additional complexity to the Federal Reserve's future interest rate cut cycle in the long run. If the United States initiates interest rate cuts in the future while Japan's interest rates remain near zero, the US Japan interest rate differential will widen again, which may trigger a new round of yen depreciation and capital flow disturbances, disrupting the transmission effect of US monetary policy. Therefore, pushing Japanese interest rates into a "normalization zone" before the United States itself may shift towards easing can help reduce external shocks during future policy adjustments. Of course, the United States' support for Japan's interest rate hike is not unconditional, and its core stance can be summarized as "welcoming normalization but opposing excessive tightening". The United States does not want Japan to take a radical and rapid interest rate increase step, because it may cause turmoil in the Japanese treasury bond bond market, threaten the stability of Japan's financial system, and then intensify the global risk aversion, and finally bite back at American asset prices. Therefore, the expectation of the United States is for a moderate, orderly, controllable, and possibly reversible process of monetary policy normalization, avoiding any radical adjustments that may trigger systemic risks. At the level of policy communication, the United States usually does not publicly express these intentions, but rather uses intermediary channels for indirect guidance. Speeches by officials from the Ministry of Finance, research reports from think tanks, joint statements from international forums such as G7, evaluations of Japan's policies by the IMF, and biased reports from authoritative media such as The Wall Street Journal and Bloomberg are common carriers for conveying policy signals. The recent rumors of the US urging Japan to raise interest rates are a typical manifestation of this indirect but clearly intended American policy communication. Overall, the true attitude of the United States towards Japan's interest rate hike is based on a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis: it sees the normalization of Japan's monetary policy as a necessary step to stabilize the US bond market, prevent global leverage risks, reduce the probability of asset crashes during future US recessions, balance industrial competitiveness, and repair global interest rate imbalances. Under this framework, the short-term pain of Japan's interest rate hike is far lower than the cost of potential systemic crises in the future. Therefore, the United States not only tacitly approves, but also cautiously and firmly promotes this process behind the scenes.