Author: Shao Shiwei
In recent years, cases that superficially appear as virtual currency, node devices, dual-token mechanisms, and team promotion systems have increasingly come under scrutiny for organizing and leading pyramid scheme activities. Compared to traditional product-based pyramid scheme cases, these cases often inherently carry multiple features such as technical mechanisms, token structures, community governance, and layered agents, leading to significant controversies in judicial determinations regarding admission qualifications, hierarchical relationships, team compensation, and subjective knowledge.
In light of this, this article aims to analyze two publicly available cases: Terra (UST & LUNA) and the "Xinkangjia" major pyramid scheme case, to conduct a research-oriented overview of the common recognition logic, investigative focuses, and contentious issues when virtual currency projects are accused of organizing and leading pyramid scheme activities, hoping to provide a reference for relevant case officers, researchers, and those interested in the treatment paths of such cases.
The core viewpoint of this article is that when virtual currency projects are accused of organizing and leading pyramid scheme activities, judicial determinations typically revolve around membership qualifications, hierarchical relationships, team compensation, fraudulent acquisition of property, and the status of organizers and leaders; among which, dual-token models, algorithmic stablecoin mechanisms, node qualifications, direct and indirect referral rewards, and agency systems do not automatically equate to the established elements of pyramid scheme crimes, still requiring substantive judgments combined with specific regulations, sources of funds, evidence structures, and roles of the actors involved.
1 Terra and the Xinkangjia Case: Dual Tokens, Algorithmic Stablecoins, Hierarchical Promotions, and Team Compensation
(1) Terra (UST & LUNA): How Dual Token Models, Algorithmic Stablecoin Mechanisms, and High-Yield Appearances Affect Legal Evaluation
The Terra project is a blockchain project co-founded by Do Kwon and Daniel Shin in 2018. This project rapidly rose to prominence in 2021, becoming one of the hottest public chains after Ethereum. However, its core product—an algorithmic stablecoin UST claimed to be linked to 1 USD—suddenly collapsed in May 2022, falling into a "death spiral" alongside the LUNA token, resulting in approximately 40 billion USD in market value evaporating in just a few days. On December 11, 2025, Do Kwon was sentenced to 15 years in prison by a U.S. court.
In the public operational logic of the Terra project, UST serves as the algorithmic stablecoin, while LUNA functions as the core token operating in tandem with it, together forming a relatively typical dual-token structure. The basic design idea is to maintain UST’s price peg through a mint-and-burn mechanism, with LUNA absorbing price fluctuations, adjusting the mechanism, and serving as the value bearer. In terms of the project’s appearance, this arrangement does not resemble the traditional notion of directly charging an entry fee, but indeed presents participants with a projection of stability and growth through technical mechanisms, pricing mechanisms, and token structures.
The research value of Terra lies in its concentrated illustration of several key appearances in virtual currency cases: first, how the dual-token model is packaged as a technical solution; second, how the algorithmic stablecoin mechanism creates the impression of sustainable operation and self-balancing in form; and third, how high-yield products and token ecosystems mutually reinforce each other, impacting participants' judgments regarding risk, return, and value support. In terms of common discussion habits in practice, the Terra sample also aids in understanding the technical packaging logic common in algorithmic stablecoin pyramid schemes, dual-token model pyramid schemes, and certain DAO project pyramid scheme cases. Particularly, within the market perceptions formed around UST, LUNA, and relevant yield scenarios, participants often see technical statements like protocols, pegging, stability, and appreciation rather than legal expressions regarding sources of funds, value support, and liquidity risks.
Terra provides us with a "technical mechanism sample." It suggests that when reviewing pyramid scheme crime cases involving virtual currencies, we cannot sever the technical structure from criminal law evaluations, nor can we omit substantial reviews of yield sources, participation thresholds, value supports, and methods of risk disclosure simply because of the appearance of on-chain mechanisms, algorithmic rules, or protocol governance. With respect to controversial concepts such as algorithmic stablecoins and dual-token models, the significance of the Terra case lies more in demonstrating how technical packaging influences legal determinations, rather than suggesting that any project with such technical designs can automatically be treated according to pyramid scheme logic.
(2) The "Xinkangjia" Case: How Entry Thresholds, Hierarchical Relationships, Direct Referral Rewards, and Team Dividends Form Pyramid Scheme Examination Samples
The Xinkangjia project is a platform established in Guizhou in 2024, which rapidly rose in the first half of 2025 under the banner of "Dubai Gold Exchange DGCX China Station," attracting around 2 million investors. However, its core model—promising an ultra-high yield of 1% per day, using USDT stablecoin as a payment tool, and employing a nine-level pyramid scheme structure for recruitment—collapsed entirely in June 2025, with founder Huang Xin transferring approximately 1.8 billion USDT (equivalent to about 12.9 billion RMB) overseas before the collapse, after which the platform closed for withdrawals. Currently, public security authorities in multiple locations have defined it as suspected fundraising fraud and organizing or leading pyramid scheme activities.
Unlike Terra which primarily reflects technical mechanisms, the Xinkangjia major pyramid scheme case presents another typical organizational expansion logic. According to publicly available information, its operational mode is closer to the common "qualification threshold—hierarchical development—team compensation" structure seen in traditional pyramid scheme crimes: participants must obtain entry qualifications in a specific way, and the internal system relies on layer-by-layer recommendations, team fission, and tiered rebates for ongoing expansion. In its organizational model, entry thresholds, agent levels, team performance, and rebate proportions typically have strong correlations, and mechanisms such as direct referral rewards, indirect referral rewards, and team dividends become essential arrangements for maintaining personnel growth and reinforcing organizational control.
The practical research significance of such cases lies in their relatively complete public information showcasing several core structures concerning organizing or leading pyramid scheme activities: first, participants are not merely consuming goods or services but are entering a system capable of developing others and earning rebates after obtaining qualification; second, there are clear hierarchical relationships within the organization that bind personnel development, team size, and income levels through rule designs; third, income distribution does not primarily rely on genuine independent business activities but rather on the funds and personnel expansions formed by subsequent members continuously joining.
From the practical contexts of "digital currency leads," "promotion of currency circle projects being arrested," "is the node model a pyramid scheme," the Xinkangjia case resembles an "organizational structure sample." It suggests to case handlers that when reviewing certain cases disguised as currency circle projects or Web3 projects, they should focus on whether a stable agent network, hierarchical rebate relationships, and team compensation mechanisms centered on personnel development have been formed, especially the core position of direct referral rewards, indirect referral rewards, and team dividends within the overall income structure. Compared to the "technical mechanism appearance" illustrated by Terra, the Xinkangjia case more directly relates to the hierarchical, compensation, and organizational control issues within the traditional pyramid scheme examination framework.
(3) From Terra to "Xinkangjia": Why Do Virtual Currency Projects Exhibit Both Technical Packaging and Recruitment Structures?
The realities represented by Terra and "Xinkangjia" are, in fact, two frequently intertwined forms appearing in current virtual currency cases. The former primarily reflects features such as dual-token structure, algorithmic stable mechanisms, and high-yield designs as technical packaging; the latter more specifically illustrates organizational expansion logic involving membership qualifications, hierarchical organizations, team dividends, and direct and indirect referral rewards.
The complexity seen in some current cases often arises from the fact that they may use technical mechanisms to create the appearance of project legitimacy and sustainability of returns, while also using agent systems, node qualifications, and team fission to form promotional income structures.
Therefore, when conducting legal evaluations of such cases, one should not merely focus on the technical design or promotional methods; interdisciplinary reviews of token mechanisms, entry thresholds, organizational structures, and sources of rebates should be undertaken holistically.
2 How to Determine Organizing and Leading Pyramid Scheme Activities: Entry Fees, Three Levels, Thirty People, Team Compensation, and Fraudulent Acquisition of Property
Article 224-1 of the Criminal Law states that organizing or leading activities under the guise of selling goods or providing services, with the requirement for participants to pay fees or purchase goods or services to gain entry qualifications and forming a hierarchy in a certain order, shall directly or indirectly use the number of personnel developed as the basis for compensation or rebates, enticing or coercing participants to continue developing others to defraud property and disrupt the economic and social order, thus constituting the crime of organizing or leading pyramid scheme activities. Regarding the application of this crime, the "Opinions on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases of Organizing and Leading Pyramid Scheme Activities" issued by the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and the Ministry of Public Security further explains issues such as membership qualifications, hierarchical relationships, organizers and leaders, and prosecution standards. In virtual currency cases, there is a relatively clear corresponding relationship between the aforementioned provisions and the two types of cases, Terra and Xinkangjia.
(1) Do the Purchase of Tokens, Equipment, or Node Qualifications Constitute "Entry Fees" in Pyramid Scheme Crimes?
In practice, case handling agencies typically believe that for determining "gaining entry qualifications through payment of fees or purchase of goods or services," the key lies not in the name of the payment but in whether the payment behavior essentially constitutes a prerequisite for entering a system, obtaining promotion qualifications, or securing rebate eligibility. The basic idea expressed in the "Opinions" is also to emphasize substance over form, meaning that the presence of goods, services, or technical appearances cannot simply lead to an exclusion of pyramid scheme nature.
In the Terra project, participants’ investments do not manifest as the traditional form of paying entry fees seen in common pyramid scheme cases, but rather as purchases, holdings, exchanges, or entry into certain token income structures. Such structures prompt case handlers to recognize that the legal appearance of payment consideration in virtual currency cases is often altered: what participants provide may not be solely fiat currency or offline payments, but could reflect stablecoin purchases, governance token holdings, yield scene accesses, staking arrangements, or other on-chain operations. In this regard, the issue of "entry fees" in virtual currency cases often requires an understanding of the relationship between token functions and participation qualifications.
In contrast, the Xinkangjia case aligns more closely with traditional recognition paths. If participants must first pay consideration to then gain qualifications for joining the system, developing subordinates, advancing levels, or participating in team rebates, such payments are easier for case handling agencies to interpret as entry thresholds within the crime of organizing or leading pyramid scheme activities. Especially in some cases where payment behaviors are closely tied to subsequent promotion qualifications, case handling agencies typically lean more towards believing they meet the constitutive characteristics of "gaining entry qualifications through payment of fees or purchase of goods or services."
From a defense perspective, however, there remains a certain degree of controversy around the entry fee requirements.
Lawyer Shao believes that in virtual currency cases, whether purchasing equipment, subscribing to nodes, holding tokens, or completing staking automatically constitutes entry fees under pyramid scheme laws cannot be judged solely based on payment facts but should examine the following aspects: whether the relevant equipment, services, or tokens have genuine use value independent of promotion qualifications; whether the payment behavior is necessarily linked to personnel development or team compensation; and whether participants can obtain primary rights in the same legal relationship without developing others. In other words, whether node models, dual-token models, or token participation arrangements in DAO projects automatically equate to "paying entry fees" cannot be uniformly applied in the context of the crime of organizing and leading pyramid scheme activities.
(2) How to Calculate "Three Levels and Above, Thirty People and Above" in Pyramid Scheme Crimes: Agency Levels, Invitation Code Relationships, and Real Number Identifications
According to the "Opinions," if the number of individuals participating in pyramid scheme activities within the organization exceeds thirty and the hierarchy exceeds three levels, the organizers and leaders should be prosecuted. In practice, case handling agencies typically use referral relationships, registration links, backend hierarchy charts, revenue distribution paths, and team performance structures to quantify and assess the hierarchical numbers and organizational network.
The Xinkangjia case is better suited as a typical example for this issue. If there are clear upstream, downstream, and subordinate relationships within the system, and different levels achieve stable team performance penetration and rebate distribution through rules, it becomes easier to recognize such a structure as a "three levels and above" hierarchical structure in a criminal law sense. At this point, the identification of "thirty people and above" does not merely refer to the direct number of developments at one level but often includes direct and indirect developing individuals throughout the entire network.
However, the Terra case also reminds us that hierarchical relationships in virtual currency projects do not automatically equal pyramid scheme hierarchy as defined in law. Wallet relationships, protocol participation relationships, ecological governance relationships, and node collaboration relationships may technically present a certain upstream-downstream, early-late, core-periphery structure, but this structure does not necessarily possess the organizational control attributes of "upstream-downstream-subordinate" in criminal law. If all on-chain participation relationships, community governance relationships, or token holding relationships are mechanically equated with pyramid scheme hierarchies, legal evaluations may become excessive.
From a defense perspective, the recognition of hierarchical relationships in virtual currency cases often revolves around contentious issues such as: whether wallet addresses, device numbers, backend accounts can reliably correspond to natural person identities; whether situations exist involving one person multiple accounts, multiple people using one account, testing accounts, empty accounts, or duplicate accounts; and whether nominal titles such as city partners, regional nodes, community leaders align with actual management authority and organizational control. Common contentious issues in practice—such as how to calculate "three levels and above, thirty people and above" in pyramid scheme crimes, and whether agent levels are automatically counted as pyramid scheme levels—essentially concentrate on these aspects.
Lawyer Shao suggests that in such cases, superficial referral relationship charts, device activation orders, or community hierarchies cannot automatically replace the criminal law sense of hierarchy recognition; the establishment of hierarchy should still rely on thorough reviews of genuine participation, stable relationships, and rebate rules.
(3) Do Direct Referral Rewards, Indirect Referral Rewards, and Team Dividends Constitute Pyramid Scheme Compensation and Fraudulent Acquisition of Property?
In the judicial determination of organizing and leading pyramid scheme activities, team compensation and "fraudulent acquisition of property" are usually the two most contentious parts. In practice, case handling agencies generally focus on examining: whether returns largely depend on the quantity of developed personnel, team scale, and the performance of subordinates as the basis for rebates; whether the source of rebates primarily relies on the funds generated by subsequent participants continuously joining; and whether the project amplifies profits, minimizes risks, and packages technical mechanisms in a way that induces participants to continue delivering property based on misconceptions.
Regarding Terra, its value lies in illustrating how technical mechanisms influence participants' understandings. The algorithmic stablecoin, dual-token structure, high-yield scenarios, and related promotional language frequently lead participants to perceive a project as self-balancing, yield having systemic safeguards, and risks being digestible through technology. This technical expression does not necessarily constitute false advertising in pyramid scheme crimes, yet it enlightens us that in virtual currency cases, the examination of "fraudulent acquisition of property" cannot detach from the combination of technical mechanisms and market promotions. Particularly when high-yield designs coexist with risk obscuration, whether participants’ property delivery is based on misconceptions often becomes the focal point of case disputes.
The Xinkangjia case more reflects another recognition path closer to traditional pyramid schemes. If direct referral rewards, indirect referral rewards, and team dividends within the system mainly correlate with personnel development numbers and team expansion scales for rebate bases, and the source of these rebates does not arise from independent business activities but largely comes from subsequent participants' payment considerations, then it becomes easier for case handling agencies to interpret this as "directly or indirectly using the number of developed personnel as a basis for compensation or rebates." On this basis, if the project further entices members to join by stabilizing income, fast return on investment, or earning from team fission, it becomes easier for case handling agencies to argue towards "fraudulent acquisition of property."
However, from a defense perspective, team compensation does not automatically equate to fraudulent acquisition of property, nor does a project's collapse automatically reverse the legal evaluation of past actions. This article argues that in virtual currency cases, determining team compensation and "fraudulent acquisition of property" should at least focus on four aspects: first, whether the source of returns is genuinely independent of subsequent personnel joining or primarily relies on new participants; second, whether projects possess verifiable independent business scenarios, technological services, or ecological support; third, the character of relevant high-yield promotions—whether they belong to market visions, commercial statements, or sufficient factual promises leading participants to misconceptions; fourth, the direct causes for participants delivering property—whether stemming from investment decisions, technical participation, purchasing equipment, or expectations of hierarchical rebates and stable returns. Failing to conduct specific reviews on these issues while merely relying on "having tokens, having promotions, having returns" to complete the proof of pyramid scheme crimes clearly carries the risk of oversimplification.
3 How Are Virtual Currency Pyramid Scheme Cases Investigated: On-Chain Data, Electronic Data, and Agent Testimony as Paths of Evidence
After being accused of organizing and leading pyramid scheme activities, the methods of proving cases by investigative agencies often have clear differences from traditional offline pyramid scheme cases. Its core characteristic lies in the fact that case facts are often not merely established through physical account books, offline training materials, and personnel statements, but rather rely more on on-chain data, backend data, electronic data, and the cross-verification of oral evidence. Thus, analyzing the investigative focuses in such cases is indeed an important prerequisite for understanding their legal evaluation logic.
(1) How On-Chain Data Can Be Used to Prove Hierarchical Relationships, Fund Aggregation, and Rebate Mechanisms
In virtual currency cases, the role of on-chain data in investigation usually extends beyond merely proving that a transfer record exists between certain addresses; it concerns reconstructing the internal flow of assets and rules of returns within the project through transaction hashes, address aggregations, contract call records, staking and release records, and yield distribution paths. Case handling agencies typically will attempt to prove: how the virtual assets delivered by participants enter the control pathways of project parties; whether stable aggregation relationships exist between specific addresses; how the distribution of returns across different levels structurally corresponds to referral relationships and team relations; and whether on-chain behaviors such as staking, redemption, issuance, and dividends align with the declared return mechanisms of the project. Regarding the crime of organizing and leading pyramid scheme activities, the most crucial direction for proving on-chain data is not merely that trades took place on-chain, but rather how these transactions form systemic connections with entry qualifications, hierarchical structures, and rebate mechanisms.
(2) Why Chat Records, Training Materials, and Backend Screenshots Can Become Key Evidence in Pyramid Scheme Cases
Aside from on-chain data, electronic data is usually one of the most critical evidence forms during the investigation stage. Common materials include group chat records, training course materials, promotional posters, roadshow videos, voice presentations, APP backend screenshots, device activation records, server mirror files, and email correspondence. These materials often target several issues: how the project introduces itself externally; how returns are explained and displayed; how the agent system is set up and managed; and how direct referral rewards, indirect referral rewards, and team dividends are solidified in the rules. For criminal cases involving Web3 projects, the significance of electronic data lies in its ability to verify technical statements, market statements, return statements, and hierarchical statements within the same evidence chain, thereby influencing case handlers’ overall judgment about the project's nature.
(3) To What Extent Can Testimonies from Agents, Community Leaders, and Promoters Prove Case Facts?
In such cases, the testimonies of agents, promoters, community managers, and ordinary participants also hold significant importance, especially in directly proving training content, organizational architecture, promotional methods, and rebate rules. However, in practice, the evidentiary power of agent testimonies is not inherently stable. On the one hand, individuals at different levels may vary in their understanding of project mechanisms, depth of contact, and interests; on the other hand, some testimonies may reflect personal interpretations more than they accurately represent the project rules themselves. Therefore, case handling agencies usually still need to corroborate oral evidence with backend data, electronic materials, and on-chain records when employing testimonies. It must also be emphasized that while agent testimonies are often important in such cases, they cannot independently fulfill the entire proof requirements for hierarchical relationships, income structures, and organizational controls.
4 Major Controversies and Defense Strategies in Such Cases
In such cases, especially regarding accused individuals and their families, questions often arise such as: how is the crime of virtual currency pyramid scheme determined, what should be done if a currency circle project gets arrested, is the dual-token model a pyramid scheme, is the node model a pyramid scheme, and do city partners count as organizers and leaders? Although these questions may be stated differently in legal terms, they can essentially be summarized into several contentious points.
(1) Major Controversies in Virtual Currency Project Pyramid Scheme Cases: Common Defense Strategies and Determinative Boundaries
In virtual currency cases, the forms of payment made by participants are more diverse than traditional pyramid scheme cases, possibly manifesting as equipment purchases, node subscriptions, token holdings, stablecoin exchanges, protocol staking, and more. Case handling agencies typically lean towards assessing the legal function of payment behaviors to determine if they constitute thresholds for gaining entry qualifications.
However, from a defense standpoint, purchasing equipment, tokens, or node qualifications does not automatically equate to entry fees under criminal law. The core of the dispute lies not in whether payment has been made, but rather in whether such payment is essentially used to acquire promotion, rebate, or tier qualification, and whether related equipment, services, or tokens possess genuine value independent of organizational expansion. For dual-token model pyramid schemes and algorithmic stablecoin pyramid scheme cases, this often becomes one of the first contentious points raised.
(2) If There Are Referral Relationships and Agent Levels, Do They Automatically Meet the "Thirty People and Above, Three Levels and Above" Criteria?
For cases involving arrests for promoting currency circle projects, one of the most common lines of accusation is the presumption that the presence of invitation code relationships, agent rank structures, and referral networks must imply the formation of pyramid scheme hierarchies. However, from a normative judgment perspective, formal referral relationships cannot simply equate to hierarchical relationships as defined by criminal law. Especially in virtual currency projects, mapping relationships between wallet addresses, device accounts, node numbers, and natural person identities often exhibit complex correspondences, and the numbers reflected in hierarchical diagrams may not equal the actual number of participants. Thus, assessments of "thirty people and above, three levels and above" still require specific examinations of their authenticity, stability, and legal relevance, without generalizing judgments solely based on schematic representations or title names.
(3) If There Are Direct Referral Rewards, Indirect Referral Rewards, and Team Dividends, Do They Automatically Constitute Pyramid Scheme Compensation?
Direct referral rewards, indirect referral rewards, and team dividends are among the most scrutinized structural features in cryptocurrency recruitment cases. Case handling agencies typically view these as important indicators of compensation based on personnel development numbers.
However, from a defense perspective, the titles of these rewards themselves cannot substitute for legal evaluations. The key remains: whether the basis for rebates is the number of team personnel or some independent transaction, service, or ecological behavior; whether the sources of income primarily derive from the entry of new participants or involve real independent business support; and the position of the reward system within the overall project—whether it is an ancillary promotional arrangement or a central mechanism driving project operation. If these questions are not thoroughly examined, team rewards may easily be oversimplified into constituting pyramid scheme compensation.
(4) Are Agents, City Partners, and Community Leaders Automatically "Organizers or Leaders"?
Within virtual currency projects, it is common to find roles such as agents, city partners, regional nodes, community leaders, and guild presidents. However, the mere existence of these titles doesn’t equate to legal recognition, nor does receiving certain profit proportions automatically imply reaching an organizational or leadership level. In practice, determining who qualifies as organizers and leaders must still consider whether they participate in system design, understand team control, are responsible for training recruitment, hold backend permissions, or can effectively decide on income distribution. In other words, nominal ranks, market titles, and positions of organizational control in刑法 do not necessarily overlap. This issue will be discussed in more detail later.
(5) How to Define Responsibility Boundaries Among Different Roles in Technology, Operations, Marketing, and Community?
In the same virtual currency project, the roles, stages of participation, authority ranges, and profit models of different personnel often display significant discrepancies. The behavioral patterns, subjective perceptions, and control extent over project rules among core technical personnel, operations management staff, marketing recruits, community maintenance staff, and ordinary agents vary considerably, leading to the inappropriate treatment of criminal liability as a uniform matter. Especially in certain criminal cases involving Web3 projects, the public often confuses participation in a project with automatically bearing equal criminal liabilities. However, from a normative judgment perspective, differences in roles, authority, and understanding can correspond to entirely different responsibility boundaries. This matter also merits a systematic analysis.
5 Virtual Currency Projects, DAO Projects, and Dual Token Model Cases Should Not Be Treated Homogeneously
When virtual currency projects are accused of organizing and leading pyramid scheme activities, the judicial determinations need to avoid two contradictory simplifications: first, that the presence of blockchain, dual tokens, algorithmic stability, and node ecology should automatically lessen the substantial review of their organizational structures, sources of income, and rebate rules; second, that the existence of promotional relationships, team rewards, and agency systems should necessarily equate them with traditional pyramid scheme cases. The cases of Terra and "Xinkangjia" highlight the current reality where "technical mechanisms" and "organizational structures" often coexist and overlap in such cases. Handling these cases should revert to analyzing specific regulations, actual operations, evidence structures, and roles of the actors involved, thoroughly assessing admission qualifications, hierarchical relationships, team compensation, property delivery, and subjective knowledge step by step.
This article primarily addresses the general recognition standards for the crime of organizing and leading pyramid scheme activities in virtual currency projects. Subsequent articles will discuss two more practically significant issues:
First, whether agents, city partners, and community leaders in virtual currency projects will necessarily be recognized as organizers or leaders;
Second, how to delineate the boundaries of criminal responsibility among personnel in various roles such as technology, operations, marketing, and community.
The former will focus on addressing whether "agents and city partners necessarily constitute organizers or leaders," while the latter will concentrate on discussing "the boundaries of criminal responsibility for personnel in different roles in Web3 projects and DAO projects."
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