Some say this is the worst oil crisis since the 1970s.

Gas stations in Thailand and Vietnam have run out of fuel, forcing people to work from home; chip factories in South Korea are beginning to worry about helium supply; Japan has started discussions about buying oil from Alaska; food aid organizations in Africa are anxious about where to find food if the war continues for another three months.

These events occurred simultaneously this week, and the impact of the war on the world is more chaotic than we imagined.

Since the outbreak of the Middle East war, the Strait of Hormuz has effectively come to a standstill, leaving nearly 20% of the world's crude oil and liquefied natural gas supplies hanging in the balance. Oil prices jumped 40% directly from pre-war levels, reaching $110 per barrel, while Iran publicly declared its goal is to push this figure to $200. Qatar's Ras Laffan LNG facility was bombed, a supply node accounting for 20% of the global natural gas trade, and restoring production capacity may take years.

So when will this war end, and how will it end? The editorial team at BlockBeats has compiled five of the most likely scenarios.

In April, a quick resolution

This is the most ideal scenario, and some analysts believe this is what Trump desires most: the war will end shortly.

After all, Trump’s way of thinking has never resembled that of a general; he is more like a CEO who wants to move on to the next deal after finishing this one. He has said himself: the United States has won almost every battle in history but has lost too many wars, not due to inability to win but because they don’t know how to exit gracefully after victory. Vietnam was like this, Iraq was like this, and Afghanistan was like this. He does not want a repeat performance.

Thus, in the military operation code-named "Epic Fury," the U.S. military prioritized "precision decapitation" strikes against high-ranking Iranian officials and "demilitarization" attacks on nuclear capabilities, missile facilities, and naval forces. Once these "tiger's teeth" that threaten the security of the U.S. and its allies are completely removed, Trump plans to transition the military operation into a conclusion stage.

According to the path of this scenario, the ceasefire timing would occur around April, with several corresponding time points.

The first time point is the visit to China. Trump's original plan to visit China was at the end of March or beginning of April, but it has now been postponed to late April or early May. Trump does not want to be distracted by an unresolved "Middle East mess" while visiting Beijing; he needs to appear as a victor to gain greater leverage in U.S.-China trade negotiations. Treasury Secretary Mnuchin has also confirmed that the delay is purely due to the need for command during the war, while trade negotiations are progressing smoothly in Paris. This means the diplomatic route is clear, waiting only for the military side to wrap up.

The second time point is the midterm elections. As the November midterm elections approach, Trump needs a stable economic environment, especially stable oil prices and expectations of Federal Reserve interest rate cuts. If inflation triggered by the war continues for more than six weeks, it will penetrate the entire supply chain and reflect in the summer corporate earnings reports, making it difficult for the Republican Party. Lowering oil prices from peak levels is necessary to drive the Fed to take action on rate cuts around September under the guise of an "employment emergency," ensuring a final victory in the midterm elections.

Iran's offer, buying a way out with oil commissions

Currently, the negotiation situation between the U.S. and Iran presents a strange "Rashomon": Trump claims progress is being made, but Iranian Speaker of Parliament Qalibaf and state media firmly deny any contact.

Recently, Trump revealed that the current interlocutors are a "completely different group," who have delivered a substantial gift involving oil and gas, rumored to be offering 5% of Iran's oil sales as a commission, to be paid directly to the U.S. If this figure is accurate, based on Iran's export scale, it amounts to a considerable sum.

Who are these "completely different people"? They are likely the regular Iranian military (Artesh), rather than the well-known Revolutionary Guard (IRGC), who are loyal to the supreme leader. There has long been a deep-rooted conflict between these two forces; Artesh is the national army, while IRGC is an ideological tool. When survival pressure reaches a certain level, moderate figures in the regular army may choose to bypass the supreme leader and quietly reach out to the U.S., which is not without precedent and not impossible.

However, from Iran's perspective, there is a certain political stance in steadfastly maintaining "denial of negotiations."

Iran is well aware that Trump highly values market performance. Just after the U.S. announced a pause in strikes, global oil prices and U.S. stocks quickly stabilized. By denying negotiations, Iran aims to dilute Trump's economic "windfall" and prevent the U.S. from gaining more leverage at the negotiating table. Additionally, maintaining legitimacy of rule is crucial; for the mullah regime, which relies on a tough-guy image, openly negotiating with the "Great Satan" would be politically suicidal.

Some senior military analysts have pointed out that while Trump threatens to bomb Iranian power stations, he has recently temporarily loosened oil export sanctions on Russia and Iran. This is not weakness but a manifestation of Trump's "America First" logic. He needs Iranian oil to continue flowing into the market to stabilize inflation, but he absolutely cannot allow Tehran to control the strait. This approach of "holding a big stick in one hand and giving a green light in the other" essentially positions Iran's energy infrastructure as a dynamic lever, using a five-day grace period to test the other party's bottom line.

However, this script has its risks. Strategist Hansen offers a more sober assessment: such a compromise is at best a "pause button for war," the ideological foundation of Iran has not been shaken, and the next Revolutionary Guard and next proxy militia will eventually emerge. A more realistic obstacle comes from Saudi Arabia. Crown Prince MBS has a very direct attitude: there can be no halfway stop. From Saudi Arabia's perspective, stopping halfway leaves an Iran filled with hatred but still with room to breathe, which is more dangerous than not going to war at all. Saudi Arabia is pressuring Trump to use this historic window to completely eliminate the hardline regime.

Furthermore, some analysts point out that Prince Pahlavi, the son of Iran's last king who has been in exile for nearly half a century in the United States, is gradually becoming the "greatest common divisor" of the opposition forces within Iran. Perhaps for the U.S., blocking the Strait of Hormuz is merely a tactical game, while supporting Pahlavi (or a coalition government centered around him) to take over Iran is what can fundamentally eliminate the Middle East energy threat and reshape the geopolitical landscape.

Reza Pahlavi, son of the last king of Iran, in exile

Seize islands and control the strait, continue to strike Iran

If negotiations break down, or if Trump decides to continue ramping up military actions simultaneously with negotiations, then the battlefield focus will shift to several small islands surrounding the Strait of Hormuz.

Jumra Island, Greater and Lesser Tunb Islands, Abu Musa Island—these names, normally not often mentioned, control the passage for about one-fifth of global oil trade. Whoever takes these islands will have access to the "master switch" of Middle Eastern energy dynamics.

Map of Iranian islands

The strategic intent of the U.S. military here is quite clear: to bypass the quagmire of Iran's interior and directly control the "valve" of the strait. This is a typical "maritime centrism" approach, seeking not to occupy but to choke off. Greater and Lesser Tunb Islands and Abu Musa Island also have an additional value: they are disputed territories between the UAE and Iran. After U.S. control, they could be handed directly to the UAE, establishing a long-term defensive circle of allies while sending a significant political gift to Gulf countries.

Some military analysts point out that signs of further troop deployment by the U.S. military are already quite evident. Recently, there were 17 C-17 transport aircraft intensively flying to the Middle East, with six of them coming from Fort Bragg, the base of the 82nd Airborne Division and Delta Force. The core capability of the 82nd Airborne Division is speed; it can deploy globally within 18 hours, and the advance forces are already in place. The amphibious Marines arriving from Okinawa and California are responsible for long-term control of larger islands, which will take an additional three to four weeks to fully arrive.

The so-called "five-day window" is actually meant to wait for heavy expeditionary forces to arrive at designated locations and provide final terrain reconnaissance for special operations units.

Among these, the most sensitive variable is Khark Island. This island accounts for 90% of Iran's oil exports and has extremely high strategic value, but it is filled with large oil storage tanks. Once a major fire breaks out, global oil prices will immediately spiral out of control, which is a result that the U.S. cannot afford either.

According to an analysis report from the Hudson Institute, ten days before the war, the U.S. targeted over 5,000 targets, and this high-intensity "demilitarization" tempo is essentially waging a "war of industrial capability deprivation" in the 21st century.

Thus, this viewpoint suggests that if a short-term conclusion is not achievable and pressure continues, the more plausible military action is to use special forces for precise control rather than brute force. The goal of the war is not necessarily to overthrow the Iranian regime, but to achieve "tactical weakening." Similar to how the Allied forces targeted Germany's industrial capacity in the late stages of World War II. The aim is to dismantle the regional projection capabilities Iran has accumulated over decades, including nuclear facilities, ballistic missile production bases, and naval strength.

In the end, Iran could be weakened to a "large Hamas," meaning the regime survives, but loses substantial threat capabilities to the world within the next 10 to 20 years.

Jiang Xueqin's prophecy: America will lose

Recently, the name Jiang Xueqin has gained widespread attention because a video of him discussing international situations in a high school classroom in Beijing two years ago has been repeatedly circulated. The person giving the lecture is Jiang Xueqin, who back then judged based on historical and geopolitical logic that Trump might be re-elected, and America might take action against Iran. As some of his judgments have been validated by reality, his YouTube subscriber count has surged, and he has been dubbed "China's Nostradamus" by many netizens. Full interview translation: "Full text of Jiang Xueqin's latest interview: How to view the current global changes")

His core judgment about this Middle Eastern war is: America may tactically win every battle, but at the strategic level, it is losing this war.

Why?

First, the U.S. military is too heavy and Iran is too agile. Iran has been preparing for this day for more than 20 years; it knows the U.S. military's operational logic very well and has designed countermeasures for each scenario. Two aircraft carriers: the Ford and Lincoln are indeed there, but because Iran possesses hypersonic weapons and massive suicide drones, the aircraft carriers dare not approach Iran's coastline, turning the massive steel fortresses into distant decorations. Simulations within the U.S. military have repeatedly shown that America would lose, not due to insufficient firepower, but because this system cannot handle this kind of opponent.

The second reason is that once ground troops step onto land, it is a bottomless pit. Jiang Xueqin views the plan to capture Khark Island as a typical sunk cost trap. The island may be taken, but it is too close to Iran's mainland to defend. To hold the island, one must control the coastline; to control the coastline requires delving into the Zagros Mountains. The tasks will expand endlessly like a snowball, following the same path as the Vietnam War; no one intends to pursue this path, but once embarked upon, it is hard to turn back.

The third reason is that the Shiite theological framework is the variable most easily underestimated by the West. In the Shiite narrative, compromising with unjust enemies is the real failure, and even if death is inevitable, resistance must continue. The U.S. and Israel’s choice to assassinate Khamenei and his family precisely touches upon the deepest trauma of "betrayal" in Shiite history. This will not make Iran capitulate; it will only intensify the resistance of the entire Shiite world, making them more resolute in combat.

More challenging is that the U.S. now has no real exit strategy. If they withdraw, Iran will issue an astronomical bill, an estimated $1 trillion in compensation, plus demands for the U.S. to permanently leave the Middle East. In that case, Gulf countries will collectively turn to Iran, the petrodollar system will be undermined, and the confidence of Japan, South Korea, and Europe in America's protective capabilities will collapse. If fighting continues, America's $39 trillion debt and economy's reliance on foreign purchases of dollars cannot support a protracted war of attrition.

Advancing means a quagmire. Retreating means defeat.

The picture painted by Jiang Xueqin for the future is grim: the war evolves into a long-term consumption similar to Ukraine, Saudi Arabia declares war on Iran and drags Pakistan in, Iran pushes oil prices to $200 per barrel, and significant destruction of Qatar's LNG facilities leads to a long-term online outage of 20% of global gas trade, with energy crises first breaking out in East Asia and Southeast Asia. More distantly, three structural trends will simultaneously return: deindustrialization brought by the end of cheap energy, remilitarization due to the collapse of "peace under U.S. hegemony," and neo-mercantilism born from fracturing globalization.

On American soil, if Trump promotes nationwide conscription, the politically polarized divisions will send the National Guard into cities; America will head toward a prolonged state of unrest similar to Northern Ireland’s "Troubles," not civil war, but not much better either.

This script has no winners, only varying degrees of losers.

In the end times, they are waiting for the Messiah

The final script is one that many rationalists are unwilling to take seriously because it sounds too much like science fiction. But neglecting it is the truly unserious attitude.

Within Israel, there exists an apocalyptic fervor. Some rabbis and followers no longer view this war through the lenses of security logic or geopolitical logic; they regard it as a catalyst for the "coming of the Messiah." In this framework, the greater the pressure Israel endures, the closer divine intervention becomes.

The most dramatic element of this apocalyptic script is

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