On April 2, 2026, East Eight Time, during negotiations in Washington around the CLARITY Act, the clause regarding whether on-chain dollar assets can pay returns to holders has become the absolute focus of legislative maneuvering. One side is the traditional banking industry, claiming that if on-chain dollars can "pay interest," it will significantly siphon off deposits from the banking system; the other side is the cryptocurrency industry, emphasizing that there is currently no public data to prove that deposits are systematically flowing out due to on-chain returns. As this line of contention tightens, Coinbase Chief Counsel Paul Grewal publicly signals that "the return dispute is very close to reaching an agreement," while cryptocurrency journalist Eleanor Terrett frequently reminds: there is limited time left before the critical congressional vote window, and the text has yet to be published, increasing the already tight time pressure.
Banks Surround Stablecoin Interest: The Battle for Deposits and the Fate of On-Chain Dollars
The current demand from banks is very straightforward: a blanket ban on on-chain dollar products paying returns to ordinary holders. The public reason is that "interest-paying dollar tokens" would constitute unfair competition to deposits — banks must comply with capital adequacy, deposit insurance, and a whole set of prudent regulations, while on-chain issuers, if allowed to pay returns without the same regulatory burdens, effectively constitute "shadow banks." In their narrative, as long as returns are allowed, during the next market fluctuation, fragile depositors could rush in, transferring bank deposits to high-yield on-chain assets.
In contrast, the cryptocurrency industry's rebuttal in Washington centers around one key point: there is currently no solid empirical data to prove that U.S. bank deposits are systematically flowing out because of on-chain returns. Whether it is the publicly available bank liability structure or the growth rate of on-chain assets, it is challenging to correspond accurately to a simple "deposits being drained" story. Industry representatives emphasize that the funding volatility in the banking system over the past few years is highly correlated with traditional factors like interest rate cycles and commercial real estate risks, while on-chain dollars play a role more akin to cross-platform settlement and trading collateral, making the concern that they will "siphon all deposits" logically exaggerated.
What makes the debate more acute is that whether to allow returns will directly shape the competitive landscape of dollars on-chain. If returns are completely banned, compliant dollar tokens will degenerate into a "non-interest payment pipeline," placing them at an absolute disadvantage in competition with other high-yield dollar tools; conversely, if returns are allowed and institutionalized in some form, the on-chain dollar will no longer just be a payment medium, but will transform into a bonded asset class. This would not only reshape the logic of how users allocate among "bank deposits—money market funds—on-chain dollars," but also determine whether the U.S. is willing to allow part of the value curve of "dollar interest" to transfer onto public blockchains.
Text Delays: Delay Tactics and "Countdown to Time Window"
Eleanor Terrett explained in her latest report why the delayed publication of the bill text itself is a strategy: supporters fear that once the complete text is released too early, bank lobbyists and hard-line opponents could launch a "delay campaign" around specific wording — through minor amendments, procedural challenges, and delays, pushing the already tight legislative timetable repeatedly backward until this congressional session ends, effectively "killing" the returns clause.
From the congressional schedule and election rhythm, the current round of maneuvering around CLARITY has entered a clear countdown to the time window. In the second half of 2026, U.S. political attention will be completely consumed by elections and budget disputes, leaving extremely limited discretionary time for technical financial legislation. Any procedural delay, any reshuffling of key committee agendas, could mean that this round of attempts would be pushed into the next political cycle. It is against this backdrop that the text was intentionally “pressed to the last moment” for publication, serving as both procedural risk management and chip management.
This strategic secrecy has directly impacted market expectations and the allocation of industry lobbying resources. On one hand, the lack of specific wording means that market participants can only capture regulatory trends through scattered statements, with price responses being suppressed to an emotional expectation level, rather than trading sentence by sentence around the text. On the other hand, the industry lobbies must bet early under conditions of incomplete information: whether to stake resources on a "completely allowing returns" hardline proposal, or to accept a possible compromise from the outset and seek broader "activity rewards" space. The opacity of the text, to some extent, forces both sides to bet in a black box, amplifying the marginal impact of every public statement.
Grewal's "Very Close": Optimism, Compromise, and Grey Areas
In such an uncertain environment, Paul Grewal has repeatedly emphasized that the debate surrounding the returns clause is " very close to reaching an agreement." Such statements are understood within the cryptocurrency industry as a form of cautious optimism: at least in the current version of the negotiation draft, "returns" have not been simply placed on an absolute blacklist but are still being explored through intensive negotiations for a way out. For major platforms that have invested a lot of energy and resources in Washington, this means that their bet on the "compliant returns space" has not been fully lost.
A compromise notion circulating externally is "allowing activity-based rewards", for instance, through transaction rebates, loyalty points, NFT badges, etc., circumventing a direct commitment to "nominal interest." It is important to clarify that this idea still belongs to the unverified content, lacking complete text support and key legislators' public endorsement, and cannot be seen as an established path. It occupies a place in public opinion mainly because it formally rewrites the expression of returns, leaving some space for both banks and the cryptocurrency industry to "claim victory."
If a kind of intermediate proposal is ultimately reached, it is likely to find a regulatory acceptable grey area between "nominal interest not being paid" and "actual rewards existing." For example, the bill might strictly limit issuers from using terms like "fixed interest" and "guaranteed returns," while simultaneously allowing, within a compliant disclosure framework, incentives in non-cash forms to high-frequency users or long-term holders. In this way, Washington could declare that it did not allow the expansion of "shadow deposits," while the industry could restore part of the yield attractiveness in product design, allowing dollars on-chain to still have an assetized imagination space.
From the Drift Incident to Multi-Signature Governance: How Safety Black Swans are Packed as Regulatory Ammunition
In the context of the bill maneuvering, the security incident previously exposed by the Drift protocol was swiftly introduced into the regulatory discourse. What the market remembers is that a well-known trader HXiRSK suffered significant losses in the incident, and such individual cases are repeatedly cited in public opinion as vivid scenes of "financial instability on-chain." For banks and hardline regulators, this imagery aligns very well with the message they want to convey—when returns migrate on-chain, it means ordinary investors are directly exposed to risks from contract loopholes, oracle manipulation, and governance failures.
Alongside the Drift incident, the systemic issues of multi-signature account permissions and governance changes were also amplified. In traditional finance, the rights boundaries of depositors and payment priorities can be found in clear legal texts and regulatory rules; however, in on-chain projects, multi-signature holders can adjust parameters, upgrade contracts, or even freeze funds within relatively short time windows, making "who will bear the risk" an unavoidable question in legislative context. When returns are packed within such structures, regulators find it easier to describe them as a "shadow banking system without licenses under a technical facade."
Safety incidents are thus employed by banks and regulatory agencies to strengthen a narrative: "on-chain interest = high-risk shadow banking". In this narrative, every instance of contract attack, every time governance is contested, is treated as evidence that ordinary users do not have the capacity to assess infrastructure risks; thus, migrating traditional deposits to on-chain interest products becomes a high-risk behavior lacking prudent protection. This logic does not need to be meticulously data-driven as long as it is potent enough to provide an emotional basis for "a complete ban on returns" in public opinion and political space.
Promises of "Crypto Capital" During the Trump Era and the Reality Gap Under Return Clauses
Returning to a longer timeline reveals a clear political contrast. During the Trump administration, Washington boldly proclaimed the intention to make the U.S. the "global crypto capital", promising to leave space for innovation in regulation, allowing dollars to take a dominant position in the new generation of financial infrastructure. This narrative once led the industry to believe that as long as they moved towards compliance, on-chain finance would ultimately be absorbed by the system rather than being completely cut off.
Currently, the tightening pressure surrounding return clauses starkly exposes the significant gap between promises and reality. On one hand, the U.S. still hopes to maintain the dominance of dollars on-chain, unwilling to hand over the discourse power; on the other hand, when it comes to the levels of "interest" and "balance sheets," the White House, Treasury, and Congress must face the demands of the banking industry, unable to easily open a potential channel that could reshape deposit structures before traditional financial systems have completed their adaptation. Thus, the returns clause is pinned at the center of the balance, becoming a key bargaining chip in balancing the interests of banks and the cryptocurrency industry.
In the specific operation of this bargaining chip, the White House needs to achieve a political balance between the "innovation-friendly" image and the "financial prudence" narrative; the Treasury is more concerned with macro-financial stability and the international role of the dollar, reluctant to grant powers to on-chain infrastructure under excessively high uncertainty; Congress, in hearings and bill text discussions, continuously tests the bottom lines of both parties with the issue of returns. On-chain interest is thus shaped as a convergence point in a multi-faceted game: it serves both as a tool to reassure the banking industry that "don't worry, your core profit pool won't be diluted with a blanket ban" and as a means of taming the cryptocurrency industry by saying "we will give you some predictable space, but you must accept heavier regulation."
The Fate of Returns is Uncertain: Legislative Success and Various Paths for Capital Migration
Overall, the legislative offense and defense surrounding returns will determine whether U.S. compliant dollar tokens will be shaped into a high-yield asset or restricted to a "non-interest payment pipeline". If the text ultimately lands on a complete ban on nominal returns, while strictly limiting any form of "activity rewards," then the advantages of on-chain dollars will be compressed to settlement speed and programmability, making it difficult to compete with traditional dollar tools in terms of asset allocation.
In this process, it is necessary to emphasize a boundary: the amounts of bank lobbying, the specific votes, and party voting distributions currently lack verifiable public data; any quantitative or predictive conclusions are considered unacceptable fabrications. What can be reasonably discussed are only the potential pathways of various scenarios — for instance, in scenarios with significant pressure on banks, the returns clause may be further tightened or even temporarily removed from the bill; in politically favorable scenarios, the previously mentioned compromise proposals may emerge, reserving a small test area for "activity-based rewards."
If this round of legislation is delayed due to time pressures or compresses the space for returns to a nearly unusable narrow margin in compromise, the most direct consequence will be funds and innovations actively seeking other outlets. Some dollar capital may shift to on-chain products issued in foreign jurisdictions to leverage regulatory arbitrage to maintain return attributes; another portion may retreat to off-chain, utilizing structured products, derivatives packaging, and other means to bypass the direct presentation of "returns" on-chain. Among these paths, the U.S.'s dominance on public blockchains will be weakened to varying degrees, which precisely contrasts with the original grand narrative of the "global crypto capital."
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