Yet among these "gamblers," six highly suspicious accounts have emerged. Their total profit of $1.8 million all comes from accurately predicting the timing of the "U.S.-Israel strikes on Iran" and the "Israel-Hamas ceasefire" during 2025, as well as the outbreak of the current Iranian conflict and the assassination of Iran's former Supreme Leader Khamenei.

This series of remarkably precise predictions is not their only commonality. As of March 27, they have cumulatively invested nearly $185,000 in the market of "U.S.-Iran ceasefire before March 31."

If these six accounts truly can "foresee the future," then we could reverse-engineer their foresight on the ceasefire to deduce the positions of both sides.

Why Iran Wants a Ceasefire

Currently, it may be the moment when Iran has the strongest negotiating position and the most chips in this war: the blockade of Hormuz has driven up global oil prices, and no other countries are directly involved in attacks except for the U.S. and Israel, while the narrative introduced by the new leader is consolidating public sentiment with a story of resistance and patriotism.

Conversely, if the fighting continues, a series of countermeasures, such as the gradual shift of Saudi Arabia and the UAE towards more pro-U.S. stances, the continued depletion of Iran's military capabilities, and the development of alternative shipping routes through Hormuz, would lead Iran to lose its dominant position at the negotiating table.

At this point, it is essential to mention an extremely sharp question: just before the outbreak of this war, the U.S. and Iran were negotiating in Geneva, and the progress at that time was described as "productive," even "a historic agreement within reach."

However, while negotiations were still ongoing, the U.S. and Israel launched a surprise attack on Iran. Given this precedent, how can Iran trust that the U.S. will keep its promise of a ceasefire?

This touches on the nature of the ceasefire itself: for Iran, a ceasefire is not a question of trust, but a question of calculating interests. If an agreement is reached and the U.S. again reneges, Iran will further substantiate the narrative of "the U.S. being untrustworthy" on the international stage; if the agreement is upheld, Iran locks in the most favorable negotiating outcome available at the moment.

This also explains why, though Iran publicly stated "no negotiations," it has maintained information transmission through various intermediaries and specifically put forth counterproposals. Public statements are performances for domestic audiences, while actual contacts are aimed at securing the best exit conditions.

Furthermore, Iran's network of proxies has already suffered organizational splits and ammunition exhaustion during this round of warfare. Coupled with its domestic economy being on the brink of collapse long before the war (the Iranian rial has depreciated nearly 90% compared to 2018), cutting losses could be their optimal solution right now.

The U.S., Furthest from the Battlefield, Most Wants a Ceasefire

Almost a month into the war, the S&P 500 has fallen sharply since before the conflict, the Dow Jones has registered declines for four consecutive weeks, marking its longest consecutive drop in three years; gasoline prices have surged from $2.98 before the conflict to $3.98, more than a 30% increase in three weeks; the 30-year fixed mortgage rate has risen by a full half percentage point; Goldman Sachs has increased the probability of recession to 30%.

These core data points have limited short-term impact on the average American, but they are lethal for Trump—stock market and WTI oil prices are core indicators of his administration's performance.

Moreover, the U.S. government’s ideal response tool at this time—the Strategic Petroleum Reserve—has seen its effectiveness significantly diminished due to aging facilities. Since this system, designed after the 1975 oil crisis, has a lifespan of only 25 years, its actual sustainable release capacity may be only about half of what is officially promoted, or even lower.

Crucially, extracting crude oil further dissolves the internal structure of salt caverns, meaning that large-scale releases will also accelerate system aging. While releasing reserves can help Trump stabilize market sentiment in the short term, if the fighting drags on, the drawbacks of this countermeasure may manifest as skyrocketing oil prices on the candlestick charts.

In addition to financial data, U.S. domestic politics are also a factor that Trump must weigh in this round of war. When the Iraq War began, Bush's approval rating was as high as 72%; during the Afghanistan War, his approval rating exceeded 90%.

However, on the first day of this conflict, Trump’s approval rating was below 40%. The classic "rally 'round the flag effect"—where a president’s approval rating rebounds due to the outbreak of war—did not materialize in this strike. As of March 25, Trump’s overall approval rating had fallen to 36%, hitting a new low for his second term.

Moreover, his campaign promise of "No New Wars" (no new wars) threatens not only the prospects of his core circle in the midterm elections later this year but is also undermining the entire Republican party's discourse power in the 2028 presidential election.

On the other hand, Trump has set a hard deadline of May 14 for himself. He postponed his originally scheduled trip to China for next week, publicly declaring yesterday that the trip will be extended to May 14 due to the need to "stay in Washington to manage current combat operations."

It is foreseeable that Trump needs to present himself in Beijing as a "winner," rather than as a "president mired in the Middle Eastern quagmire."

Everything is Changing, But TACO Will Not Change

Currently, there is a term that specifically describes Trump’s sudden announcement of favorable developments after extreme pressure: TACO. Its full name is Trump Always Chickens Out (Trump always chickens out at the last minute).

However, in the current tense geopolitical climate in the Middle East, many believe he will not TACO and is even less likely to successfully persuade Iran to agree to a ceasefire.

Three months ago, if someone told you that Trump would bring Venezuelan President Maduro back to a U.S. court like a little chick, use Greenland as a bargaining chip for tariffs to threaten European allies at the Davos World Economic Forum, and kill Iran's supreme leader while negotiating with Iran—

These events that were previously considered to have less than a 1% probability have all occurred. And now we are looking at the future, which is the prediction market's 5% probability of a U.S.-Iran ceasefire TACO, and whether it will indeed unfold as expected.

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